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F or all the justifiable attacks on the use of stylistic labels like "manner- 
ist" and "baroque," art historians, like 
architects, continue to use the term 
"classicism" abundantly. But they have 
ceased to try to define it quite as desper- 
ately as they once did. This set of 
essays-and the symposium on which it 
is based l -d id  not set out to define it 
either. They were not planned as an 
effort of revival (although in architec- 
tural circles the subject may have 
seemed to be fashionable or prescient). 
Rather, they were conceived as an 
attempt to assess what the residual 
interest and the ideological implications 
of the term might be-however ex-
hausted it may have seemed. 
The issue, of course, also involves the 
related notions of "classic" and "classi- 
cal" ("classicizing" seems less problem- 
atic). As soon as one tries to define the 
relations-r the distinctions-between 
them, the ground turns out to be even 
swampier than expected. Every field has 
a host of writers who have sought to find 
the classical, or to define it; but their 
interests have rarely been interrogated. 
There are even classic texts-the funda-
mental ones-which are generally ac-
knowledged to have refined the term 
"classicism" most effectively or to have 
provided the most definitive and thor- 
oughgoing evaluations of classic periods, 
classic ages, and classic styles. 
No one, any longer, can doubt the 
laxity of the conventional and tradi-
tional usage of terms like "classic," 
"classical," and "classicism." Everyone 
acknowledges some sort of link between 
the two forms of usage-that is, 
between the qualitative use and the hier- 
archical use, where "classic" is used as 
somehow equivalent to the highest or 
most superior degree in the canon or 
hierarchy. The problem of assessing the 
connections between formal qualitites 
called "classical" and the authoritative 
or normative aspect of what we call 
"classic" will emerge with some acute- 
ness in the essays presented here.2 There 
are, of course, some art historians who 
persist in seeking the classical, or even in 
attempting to define it, and who do so 
unreflectively and unaware of the ideo- 
logical burdens both of the descriptive 
attempt and of the very forms they wish 
to describe. The symposium now pre-
sented in the pages of this issue of Art 
Journal was conceived in the hope that 
such pitfalls might be avoided, and that 
ideology might be more plain than 
obscure. 
For all this, there seems to have been 
some recognition of the advantages of a 
less radical and more complaisant posi- 
tion. Say one simply admitted the 
hypostatized status of classicism, on the 
grounds that it served useful terminolog- 
ical and classificatory possibilities. Such 
a position-in other words, the heuristic 
one-would justify a rather coarser use 
of the term than one might otherwise be 
inclined to allow. Of all the papers 
printed here, Jean-Claude Lebensztejn's 
most strongly exemplifies the benefits of 
this stance, although most of the others 
share it to a somewhat lesser degree. 
John Hay remains the skeptic in the 
group, a t  any rate with regard to his 
insistence on the fundamental cosmolog- 
ical differences between Western values 
based on morphologies of order and Chi- 
nese ones based on change and becom- 
ing. Henri Zerner insists most strongly 
on the ideological basis of classicism and 
proposes the extent to which the power 
attributed to it is and has to be rooted in 
nature. By concentrating on particular 
examples, Natalie Boymel Kampen and 
Martin Powers demonstrate the ideolog- 
ical dimension and the political uses of 
what is taken to be classic or classical or 
both. Powers makes an eloquent case for 
the social and political purposes of clas- 
sical revivals in China, while Kampen 
develops a view that makes the ideologi- 
cal point most trenchantly of all: the 
view that classical modes are used to 
reinforce masculinist norms of morality 
and to persuade the Other, notably the 
female Other, to become like Self. Hay, 
in demonstrating the difficulty of assess- 
ing the problem of classicism in non-
Western traditions, concludes that "the 
dialectic of order and nature is quintes- 
sentially Western and lies at the root of 
many of our greatest achievements"; but 
William Childs's analysis of the sculp- 
ture of what is unanimously regarded as 
the quintessentially classic period in 
Western art subverts even this seem-
ingly unexceptionable view. He asserts 
that  what we now conventionally 
assume to be the characteristic features 
of classical sculpture can by no means be 
taken for granted, and should be criti- 
cally reconsidered; in short, instead of 
the qualities of idealism and abstraction 
generally associated with it, Childs 
insists on its descriptiveness and its emi- 
nent realism. 
We seem, once more, to be on the 
brink of reopening the box of definitions; 
but a t  the same time Childs's revelation 
of the straitjacket of the traditional view 
of fifth-century Phidian art poses the 
ideological question yet again. By the 
time the reader has done with this set of 
essays he or she may feel that a t  least 
one question has been settled: and that is 
that any transhistorical view (and by 
Spring 1988 7 
implication any transcultural view) is 
neither possible nor decently libertarian. 
We may smile in approval, for example, 
when Zerner reflects on the apparent 
bizarreness of the coupling of archaism 
with classicism and then goes on to show 
that when archaism or primitivism is, in 
some sense, "dominant," such a cou-
pling is altogether p~s s i b l e .~  It produces 
forms that are considered both classical 
and authoritative, "classic," in other 
words. Indeed, both Hay and Powers 
illustrate quite precisely the ways in 
which the archaic serves the classical. 
The same, of course, may go for any 
other quality held to be classical or to be 
an ingredient of the classic, classicai, or 
classicizing object. 
B ut perhaps the pendulum has swung too far in favor of ideology. At the 
time the symposium was devised, it 
seemed that there was another area to 
explore--or a t  least to broach-with 
regard to the problem of classicism: that 
of psychology, and cognitive psychology 
in particular. To do so need not imply- 
as critics of such explorations usually 
insist-the independence of cognition; 
my aim was to bring to the fore an issue 
that art historians in their recent, most 
contextual modes seem to have forgot- 
ten-perhaps willingly and deliberately. 
In any event this particular possibility 
remained entirely unexamined. I still 
believe it deserves more. 
This is how the final prospectus for 
the 1986 Symposium ran: 
The history of art in its traditional 
mode has been much concerned 
with the varieties of classicism. It 
has applied the term classical in a 
loose and generalized way, but it 
has been unable to achieve any 
kind of consensus about  its 
description and meaning. 
The aim of this symposium is to 
develop new approaches to the 
complex of problems subsumed 
under the heading of "classicism." 
It will not primarily be concerned 
with stylistic labelling, nor with 
the identification of classic peri- 
o d ~ . ~It will address the problems 
of the relationship beween what is 
regarded as the classical on the 
one hand, and prevailing ideolgies 
on the other; it will assess the 
usefulness of stylistic and dialecti- 
cal approaches; and it will recon- 
sider the relevance of canons, ide- 
als, and the analytic worth of the 
identification of classic traditions 
and revivals. 
When we speak of classicism, or of 
the classical, do we speak of ways 
of describing the qualities of 
objects; or are we talking about 
relational matters, about the rela- 
tions of objects to past ideals, and 
to forms perceived through the 
veils of nostalgia? Or  do we speak 
of the very opposite-in other 
words, of the ways in which forms 
are defined for ideological motives 
by those who behold and use 
them? By those who use them for 
immediate political aims, or who 
place them in self-justifying his-
torical relations? 
Still further questions arise when 
the problem is seen in terms of 
stylistic issues. One might, for 
example, identify any number of 
artists or works, over wide chrono- 
logical spans, in which we sense 
the arresting effects of what we 
term hieratic, stylized, formal, 
severe, or austere qualities; of 
firmly grouped and clearly dis-
posed arrangements of figures; of 
the bleak and underexpressive 
gaze; of frontality, profilarity and 
isocephaly-for example. But do 
we need such terms at all, and are 
they significantly comprehensive? 
Are these appropriate categories, 
and how are they to be grouped in 
terms of both style and effect? 
Finally one might ask what ideo- 
logical burdens they carry, and 
what the consequences are for the 
relationship between the contexts 
of production and reception. 
The intention is to address prob- 
lems like these over as wide a 
range as possible. At this sympo- 
sium the issues will be approached 
by two speakers from each of three 
backgrounds :  f rom Anc ien t  
Greece and Rome, from China, 
and from the modern period in the 
West. 
In the earlier version of the prospec- 
tus-in the 1985186 "Call for Pa-
pers"-I declared more explicitly that 
the mention of stylistic qualities often 
associated with classicism was abso-
lutely not to hypostatize it; but at the 
same time I more strongly suggested 
that the kinds of qualities broadly 
described by the terms above might be 
recurrent, and have loosely recurrent 
effects. The suggestion had no reso-
nance. Instead, the speakers-all of 
whose papers are reproduced here-
chose to concentrate on qualities that 
depended more obviously on the behold- 
er's context, more specifically on the 
beholder's social and political context. 
They were the kinds of qualities 
described by terms like purity, order, 
rationality, idealization, abstraction, 
simplicity. They were assessed, as the 
prospectus required, with respect to 
ideological load and to the relations 
between contexts of production and 
reception. The matter became clear-
est-as it does in these essays-when 
classicism is most closely related to the 
classic, to rules and to models: rules that 
are governed, as the proponents of clas- 
sicism allege, by reason; and models that 
are-by definition and deservedly-to 
be followed. But it may be that the 
combined force of the papers-with the 
exception of Childs's-has the effect of 
somewhat exaggerating the degree to 
which such terms are ideologically bur- 
dened; the question of degree is precisely 
what the symposium left open. Indeed, it 
was not even raised; whereas the ques- 
tion of the relations between canonicity 
and classicism received constant atten- 
tion, and may be said to have been 
treated with conviction. 
Little attempt, therefore, was made to 
arrive more closely a t  a means of speak- 
ing about the relationship between par- 
ticular styles (however named; but in 
this case under the rubric Westerners 
call "classical") and particular kinds of 
response. There was no effort to plot the 
interlocking data that mark the dialectic 
that arises, but is also implicit, between 
specific works and beholder; and then to 
probe beneath that surface-plotting to 
achieve a theoretical basis for a neuro- 
physiology of visual and psychological 
responses to particular forms-and to 
the kinds of forms that seem to be more 
closely related to each other than to 
other kinds (as we assume, for example, 
in the case of classicism). With the 
neurophysiological reduction at stake 
one has to make the assumption of a 
certain invariance and a certain recur- 
rence across ages and across cultures. 
This is not to make any claim for the 
priority of cognition over context; but to 
say that no style is unideological is not, 
in the end, to say a great deal. 
It may perhaps be felt that such 
expectations are pitched too high. One 
cannot, after all, expect art historians to 
undertake tasks of which they are not 
capable (say, neurophysiology). But to 
pose the cognitive question is, in the first 
instance, to insist on full theoretical 
reflexiveness; and, in the second, to sug- 
gest one way in which students of the 
history of images may enter into the 
dialogue with a field from which it has 
perhaps wrongly alienated itself. Even if 
the latter hope is too ambitious, the 
former is simply to reclaim the potential 
of psychological analysis-mutatis mu-
tandis-for the historical endeavor. 
I n any event, a more rigorous insis- tence on both the conscious and the 
unconscious political implications of 
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classical and classicizing styles may help 
to purify art  history of loose talk about 
classicism. Since Wolfflin there has not 
been much progress. Talk of classicism 
has been mixed promiscuously with talk 
of classical epochs and classical mentali- 
ties. Rationality and classicism have 
become uncritically tautologous. When 
rational epochs-as they are called- 
are deemed classical, and the seemingly 
unclassical works they are said to con- 
tain are called "unclassical" (or even, 
say,"baroqueW), then the confusions 
become clear, as in any number of sur- 
veys, including many volumes of the 
Pelican History of Art series. There may 
be apologists who more rigorously claim 
that the only way to deal with the untidi- 
ness of history is to see the stylistic 
manifestations of a particular period or 
area binomially, but in such cases one 
has again to raise the problem of cogni- 
tion, since some claim is also being made 
for binary operations of mind. These 
days this may be moot; but the problem 
is for other fields to delineate. 
In the papers presented here, there- 
fore, the reader will not find definitions 
of the classical, since each writer knew 
that it might be defined in different 
ways; they also knew that there was no 
one such thing a t  all. Instead, readers 
will find a consistent search for the 
relations between style and ideology in a 
variety of different cultures, and for 
adequate ways of viewing those rela- 
tions, usually from outside. The dialec- 
tic of classicism and power emerged as 
the main theme of the symposium. 
What did not emerge, and what will not, 
therefore, be found in these pages is any 
a t tempt  to examine the relations 
between style and cognition. Of course 
such relations are implicit throughout; 
but for any sketch of the possibilities of 
the study of the relations between social 
and aesthetic style (on the one hand) 
and the structures of mind and behavior 
(on the other), the history of art still 
remains unprepared. 
Notes 
1 "The Problem of Classicism," 1986 Annual 





2 I do not here refer specifically to the crudely 

generalizing way in which "classic" is used to 

refer to the notional epitome of a period taken 

in the broadest sense, as when people speak or 

write of the classic moments within particular 

periods or cultures. They speak of "the classic 

eighteenth century" or "classic eighteenth-

century sn:tfioxesW; but obviously such use is 

related to the authoritative canonical senses of 

the term, as when one refers to classic snuff- 

boxes (or, indeed, the classic snuffbox). It 

may be possible to codify the chief character- 

istics of snuffboxes and then determine which 

particular one (or group) partakes of most of 

them; and then call that one (or group) clas- 

sic. But by and large this adjectival use of 

"classic" betrays more clearly than most other 

usages the ideological and contextually 

skewed dimensions of the term. Judgments 

like these also clearly betray the ways in 

which they depend on notional agreements 

between the form of groups of objects; and 

with the attribution of a common spirit to a 

particular period or culture (or to a large 

enough segment of one or the other). 

3 One doesn't have to think very long before one 

generates the methodological and historio-

graphic ironies. "Primitive" art forms are 

often taken, in the West at  least, to precede 

classic art; but with the passage of time what 

is regarded as primitive easily becomes an 

ingredient of the classical-and so on. 

4 I omitted as self-evident the problem of the 

dictionary meanings and the semantic differ- 

ences between terms like "classic," "classiciz- 

ing," "classical" (cf., also n. 2 above). One 

might, of course, have asked about the degree 

to which such terms are loosely synonymous 

and the extent to which they preserve catego- 

rial differences; but the parameters of this 

particular kind of problem emerge, I think, 
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